Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency
The concept of "critical infrastructure protection" (CIP), which came into being in the mid-1990s, was placed at the forefront of U.S. national security concerns after the events of 9/11. CIP methods and resources are intended to deter or mitigate incidents caused maliciously (by terrorists or criminals), by accident or human error (chemical spills, accidental release of hazardous materials), or as the result of a natural disaster (hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods).
The debate initally was largely confined to the technical community, perhaps because of the technical knowledge requirements and inherently interdisciplinary nature of the subject. However, decisions are being made that may have far-reaching and unintended public policy consequences. For example, most control systems built for the energy industry were not designed with security in mind and now must be retooled. As well, policymakers need to be better informed about the technical considerations of CIP.
In 2007, in conjunction with the Control Systems Security Center at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), IGCC and the Center for Science and Technology Policy at George Mason University produced a public policy-focused curriculum intended to help to implement a long-term security culture within the control system community. This work continues through cooperative projects among IGCC, George Mason University, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Center for National Politics to make the nation’s critical infrastructure more resilient and better able to recover from disasters or malicious attacks.
Research
